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CORRECTIONS TO APPELLEE'S STATEMENT OF TEE CASE 
AND COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS 
, l
' paragraph (2) on
 t • -. e B n e i ill Appellee 
pLat'•••*.: At pre-trial, Commissioner Sandra Peuler awarded 
wife $2,000 per month as temporary alimony. [R 23-
25] 
The document which Plaint.i ft' is <:.i.tintj is not the pre-trial 
Recommenda . commissioner Peuler but rather is the Temporary Order 
signed by Commissioner Arnett on December 6, 1991, wherein he awarded 
the Defendant $2,000 
2. At the
 5. t-. .,:.c!.. conference held November 5, 1992, 
Commissioner Peuler proposed that permanent alimony be set at $2,000 per 
month. i P Q "1 ] 
3. At paragraph (4) on page 5 of Response Brief of Appellee, the 
Appellee states: 
(4 I Only the alimony issue remained for the bench trial of 
January 7, 1993. [TR 470-473] 
Howi«\te r , t h»:'.' i s s i;i e (, > I 111<••' v .-i 1 n < \ > I 1: he personal. property 
distribution remained as well as the Issue of attorney's fees. [TR 4 7 4, 
542] 
4. At paragraph 7.B on. page ] 0 of Response Brief of Appellee, 
the Appellee states: 
T h e parties never liveu ^ - < Lhi.i home at 
Fruitland, Utah. [TR 533] 
T' ' la.int.. i.Jt c i t e s U I M 1 o 1 .1 ov - \. i . regarding that 
home: 
1 
Mr. Peterson: Was that your marital residence during the latter 
years of your marriage? 
Ila Ernstsen: Well, just the last few months of our marriage— 
well, before he filed for divorce because— 
It is clear from Defendant's testimony that the parties did 
live together in the home at Fruit land, Utah, during the last few months 
of the marriage. 
5. At paragraph 7.D. on page 10 of Response Brief of 
Appellee, the Appellee states: 
7.D. Wife would return to the Fruitland cabin only in 
the Summer when weather permitted. [TR 536] 
This statement is simply incorrect. The Defendant 
testified as follows: 
Mr. Peterson: Now, Mrs. Ernstsen, Ila, I just want to cover a 
couple of these with you very quickly. The 
condominium fee. You currently are incurring and 
you will continue to incur that through the rest of 
this winter until you are able to move back up to 
Fruitland Height; is that correct? 
Ila Ernstsen: Yes. 
Mr. Peterson: That will be eliminated as a monthly expense when 
April or May gets here and you can get back in and 
reopen your home and make your permanent residence 
back in your home; is that correct. 
Ila Ernstsen: Yes. [TR 536] 
It is clear from the Defendant's testimony that she 
intended Fruitland to be her permanent residence. 
6. At paragraph 9 on page 11 of Response Brief of Appellee, the 
Appellee states the following: 
9. Wife's "expert" witness is a CPA who happens to be her 
nephew. [TR 406] Wife's counsel and Peterson have been 
best friends for over twenty years (since 1971) and have 
traveled the world together. [Id.] Even their wives are 
often confused for each other. [id.] Peterson has 
appeared as an expert witness for wife's counsel's client 
[Id.] 
2 
However, Randall Petersen also testified as follows: 
Craig Peterson: 
Craig Peterson: 
Randa I ] Pe ter sen: 
Craig Peterson: 
Randall Petersen: 
Craig Peterson: 
You have appeared in cases both in opposition 
to the party that 1 am representing as well as 
the party that I am represent I ng; is that 
correct? 
•jt 's correct. 
Yon have been qualified in cases as an expert 
person in more than a dozen cases before this 
Court; is that correct? 
Yes. 
And what you are deal ing with here today in 
presenting to the Court, would your position 
as the nephew of Ila Ernstsen or your position 
as my friend, personal friend and 
acquaintance, influence your testimony? 
Have you attempted in the past when you have 
appeared as a. witness in, as an expert, in 
behalf of clients that I represent or as an 
expert in behalf of clients which are in 
opposition to me, have you, in fact, tried to 
present your testimony in the same basis 
regardless of who you are appearing in behalf 
of? 
Randall Petersen: 
' paragraph 9.A. on page 11 of Hospon.se Brief nf AppelLee, 
I believe there are farl h 1 lustily In., | "T" R 
4 07-40(8] 
tne Appe • -
Peterson reviewed solely (1) the parties' 1983-1991 
individual income tax returns and (2) only the income 
from, but not Vaughn Cox' actual report of Ernstsen 
Plumbing's income for the fiscal years 1988 to 1991• [TR 
408, 432, 447] 
The statement, "'only the income front but, not Vaughn Cox' actual 
report of Ernstsen Plumbing' i\ income I lie TiscaJ years 1**88 to 19**1" 
is mis] eadi ng. Randall Petersen testified that he used a section of 
Vaughn Cox report that discloses the corporation's income for the 
fiscal yea n s ] 9 8 8 , .1 9 8 9 , ] 9 9 0 aric I ] 9 91 
3 
8. At paragraph 9.B. on page 11 of Response Brief of Appellee, 
the Appellee states: 
9.B. ...Peterson gave no authoritative basis for his opinion 
the District Court clearly accepted Morris' opinion that 
cash expenditure and depreciation equals out. [TR 429] 
This statement goes to argument rather than a statement of the 
case and course of proceedings; and, consequently, should be stricken 
from this portion of the Brief. In addition, the transcript at page 429 
is interrogation of Randall Petersen by Judge Young in support of his 
personal theories. Mr. Morris had not even testified before the Court 
yet; the Court could not have "accepted Morris' opinion" at that point. 
The statement that the District Court clearly accepted Morris' opinion 
that cash expenditure and depreciation equals out "[TR 429]" is not 
evidenced by the citation given by Appellee nor anywhere else in the 
evidence, pleadings or the Court's ruling. 
9. At paragraph 9.D. on page 11 of Response Brief of Appellee, 
the Appellee states: 
9.D. Peterson thinks most of the trucks were paid off by 1991. [TR 
427] In fact husband's Exhibit 5 shows (a) 223 monthly truck 
installments for a total of approximately $93,000 remaining 
[husband's exhibit 5] AEE's Addendum No. 4 
That statement is false. Randall Petersen testified as 
follows: 
Clark Ward: So then over time doesn't cash and 
depreciation equal themselves out? 
Randall Petersen: I guess it depends on how you depreciate the 
asset. He paid for some of those over six 
months. I think most of the cars, until 1991, 
had been paid for. [TR 427] 
In addition, Plaintiff's Exhibit No. 5 simply outlines the 
following payments from Zions Bank: 
4 
1991 
1992 
1993 
Ford L-150 
Isuzu 
Isuzu 
$445.95 4 3 payments 
465.85 46 payments 
487.31 50 payments 
These are nothing more than installment payments over time and 
they total $65,034.50, not $93,000 as represented by Defendant. 
10. At paragraph 9.E. on page 11 of Response Brief of 
Appellee, the Appellee makes the following statement: 
9.E. ...Peterson's bald statement was unsupported by a 
scintilla of evidence or authoritative basis for 
his "opinion." 
This statement should be stricken from this portion of the 
Brief as it is argument rather than a statement of the case in the 
course of proceedings. In any event, Plaintiff has ignored the 
testimony of Randall Petersen whereby foundation was laid to qualify him 
as an expert: 
Craig Peterson: Mr. Petersen, you are a Certified Public 
Accountant licensed to practice in the State 
of Utah, is that correct? 
Randall Petersen: Yes. 
Craig Peterson: And how long have you been so licensed? 
Randall Petersen: Approximately 20 years. 
Craig Peterson: And in that regard, you have your own 
accounting firm? 
Randall Petersen: Yes. 
Craig Peterson: You have been qualified in cases as an expert 
person in more than a few dozen cases before 
this Court, is that correct? 
Randall Petersen: Yes. [TR 405, 407] 
11. At paragraph 9.G. on page 13 of Response Brief of Appellee, 
the Appellee states: 
9.G. Husband is replacing his salary with truck lease 
payments. [R 420] Petersen's statement was totally 
uncorroborated showing husband simultaneously increased 
his lease payments and decreased his salary. To the 
contrary, the evidence is that the lease payments 
remained essentially the same throughout the period in 
question. 
In reviewing the citation given out of context by Appellee, Randall 
Petersen testified that if the corporation does not pay the Defendant 
the lease payment then there is more cash available in the corporation. 
The citation by Appellee actually occurred, once again, during 
examination by Judge Young: 
Judge Young: Well, I guess—let me ask it differently. I 
don't see that the location of the ownership, 
whether it is individual or corporate, makes 
that much difference in what I'm asking you, 
because if you take a net marital estate and 
you divide the net marital estate but one of 
the parties is receiving income from the 
operation of one of the assets, all right? 
Let's just take one party has a $100,000. C D . 
and the other party has a $100,000 house. All 
Right? Now, why do you take the money earned 
off the C D . and call it income and leave the 
house idle and don't call it anything? 
Randall Petersen: Because the C D . is, in fact, earning income. 
Judge Young: 
Randall Petersen: 
Judge Young: 
Randall Petersen: 
Judge Young: 
There's no question about that. But if the 
party wished to sell the house and make the 
house a $100,000 C D . , it would be earning 
income and it would be offset. 
Well, but in this case there is no reason to 
pay the lease payments out of the corporation 
and, in fact, I mean, he's simply replacing 
his wages with lease payments. I mean, you 
got to add those two together because that's 
total compensation to him. I mean, that's 
cash money that's coming out of the 
corporation and being expensed. 
I recognize that. 
And when you expense that at the corporate 
level, that has been down valuing the value of 
the corporation due to those lease payments. 
Well, that's right. So if it's down valuing 
the corporation then you may have to re-adjust 
the value of the corporation. 
6 
Randall Petersen: 
Judge Young: 
No, that's already been done. He has used the 
net incomes after those expenses. I guess, 
still, my best example is take the lease 
payments and throw 'em out of there and give 
him compensation, and it is the same thing, 
the assets are held by the corporation and 
you're right, it doesn't matter where they are 
held. What you are talking about is the cash 
flow from the corporation to him in either the 
form of wages or lease payments. And if you 
don't pay him the lease payments, then there 
is more cash available and I increase this add 
back for corporate income. 
Well, I don't quite—it is not entirely clear 
to me how you would be considering those 
assets differently, because if I've taken my 
example, and in your case the corporation is 
the $100,000 C D . and the cabin is the 
$100,000 idle asset in this particular case, 
now if one party from their asset that is 
being awarded to them independently is 
receiving the working asset and the other is 
receiving the idle asset, why should you take 
the generated income off the working asset and 
call it personal income rather than from 
employment and effort you don't take anything 
off the idle asset? 
Randall Petersen: Well, the idle asset isn't producing income. 
Judge Young: Well, I know that, but it can be changed. 
Randall Petersen: Well, we are talking about where the person 
lives. I mean, there is no availability. 
Judge Young: I'm not talking about where the person lives 
I'm talking about a recreational property and 
I 'm talking about something that could be sold 
and changed into a working asset. It seems to 
me that you're mixing the—and this is where 
I'd like you to clarify it for me—but it 
seems to me that you're mixing the assets. 
And when you divide assets you ought to take 
the assets out and the earnings off of the 
assets. If one party keeps a C D . that's 
going to give 'em income, another party keeps 
a cabin that's going to give 'em no income, 
then you don't take the party getting the 
CD., throw that into their gross income 
because, for the purpose of paying alimony, 
because that's what they've chosen to do with 
their working asset. So what I'm saying— 
7 
Randall Petersen: 
Judge Young: 
Randall Petersen: 
Judge Young: 
Randall Petersen: 
Judge Young: 
Randall Petersen: 
Judge Young: 
Randall Petersen: 
Judge Young: 
Randall Petersen: 
I see what you're saying. Then I think what 
you've got to do is, because the corporation 
is the working asset, it is the thing that is 
producing the income, and if you are going to 
do that, maybe your best approach would be to 
assume, okay, let's take the equity on the 
real property asset and let's assume some kind 
of return. 
Right. Exactly. 
A three or four percent return currently is 
about all you can get out of it if you can 
convert it to cash, whatever that equity is. 
You could do it that way or you could say, 
let's ignore both—I can see if he is keeping 
his earnings low and then supplementing it by 
a lease payment that perhaps his earnings, in 
effect, are net higher, the asset is 
generating more earnings and I can see a need 
to make some adjustment in that regard, but if 
I take—let's just suppose this case. Suppose 
we have two people, husband and wife, married, 
and that they both bring into the marriage, 
prior to the marriage, an asset. She brings 
in a house worth $100,000, he has sold his 
prior house worth $100,000 and has contact 
income. Okay? 
Mm-Hmm. 
All right. Now, they live together in their 
marriage, and let's just assume that the 
contract comes into the marriage, all right? 
Now, when you divide the marriage up at the 
end do you say, well, okay, you keep the 
house, to her, in my example, but you get 
nothing because all of your contract income 
came into the marriage? 
No. I think you take the value of the house 
and you take the value of the contract. 
And you back it out. 
Whatever the outstanding value is you add them 
together. 
After the marriage? 
No, at the time of the divorce. Because they 
both had the benefit of cash flow from the 
contract, right? 
8 
Judge Young: Right. 
Randall Petersen: 
Judge Young: 
An as Terral and the family have had advantage 
of the income from Ernstsen Plumbing. An so 
you take the two assets, the house and 
whatever the contract balance remaining is, 
you add 'em together and divided by two. And 
the income over that period of time doesn't 
represent the return of the principal 
payments, it only represents the interest 
portion of that. 
I can see that. I don't have any problem 
following that one. I could do it that way 
too. 
Randall Petersen: An that's my point here. I think that the 
corporation has provided a return in terms of 
cash to this family to live on and that's what 
I'm trying to arrive at. What is the cash 
available from the business to provide them a 
living. I mean, we have looked at the asset 
itself and valued it and said it's worth 
$95,000, and I think that value is in the 
trucks and the equipment and the good will and 
the accounts receivable. I think those are 
all assets that are value. I don't think it 
has anything to do with the income that was 
generated by that asset for the family to live 
on. I mean, it looks to me like you got to 
look at it in terms of cash that was available 
after they pay taxes and all the other things. 
Again, he could have left his salary. Instead 
of $40,000 he could have left it at $20,000 
and we'd have another $20,000 of income in the 
corporation. And I think you can't ignore 
that. 
Judge Young: I agree. I don't have any problem with that 
but I do see a difference in, if you're 
dividing equities, once you divide the 
equities you can't very well say that one 
equity, which goes to him, is nevertheless 
going to be eroding by the annual yield off of 
that equity for the purpose of dividing—or 
for the purpose of supplementing his income. 
To me, that doesn't make sense. 
Randall Petersen: Well, but here we put the value that we're— 
Vaughn Cox has put the value of the vehicles 
into the corporation. Now the value of the 
corporation is established. If that had been 
the case in all of these years that he was 
taking lease payments out of there, there'd be 
more income. 
9 
Judge Young: I understand that. 
Randall Petersen: That's the best analogy I can make, I think. 
Judge Young: Thank you. [TR 418-424] 
The last two sentences of paragraph 9.G. should be stricken 
as they are not a statement of the case and course of proceedings. 
Furthermore, the Plaintiff's statement that "the evidence shows that the 
lease payments remain essentially the same throughout the period in 
question" is not correct and is not supported by the record. [TR 486, 
487] 
12. At paragraphs 9.H., 9.1. 9.J. and 9.K. of Appellee's Brief, 
the citation to transcript page numbers are incorrect. 
13. At paragraph 9.L. on page 15 of Response Brief of Appellee, 
the Appellee states: 
9.L. Petersen acknowledged that unlike the trucks, the 
Fruitland cabin will not wear out and require 
replacement. [TR 486] 
The citation to the record is again incorrect. The correct 
citation is [TR 434]. In addition, paragraph 9.L. is a misstatement of 
Randall Petersen's testimony. Randall Petersen testified as follows: 
Clark Ward: While, the trucks depreciate and the cabin 
does not, first of all, right? 
Randall Petersen: Under the tax law, real property does 
depreciate. Part of the real property does 
depreciate just like trucks do. 
Clark Ward: Okay. But the cabin does not need to be 
replaced when it wears out approximately every 
three or four years like the trucks probably 
will. 
Randall Petersen: Yes. That's right. 
14. At paragraph 10.D, on page 15 of Response Brief of Appellee, 
the Appellee misstates the Court's finding: 
10 
10.D. Husband's monthly income of $2,914.34 
multiplied by 52 weeks divided by 12 months 
equals $1,457 per month [TR 453] 
This is an inaccurate statement of the Court's finding. Judge 
Young made the following finding: 
Now, Mr. Ernstsen has the benefit of having his [assets] work 
better than that because of his leases on the trucks that are 
part of his asset, he has it working at the rate of $787.78. 
The difference between the $674.44 which is being imputed to 
both parties, and the $787.78 is $106.34 per month. So Mr. 
Ernstsen's income is determined by the Court to reasonably be 
$2,808.00 as salaried income, $106.34 as surplus equitable 
earnings, for a combined total of $2,914.34 per month. That 
times twelve is $34,972.08. That divided by two is $17,486.00 
that should go to each. Dividing that by two, it is $1,457.00 
per month. The Court determines that it would be appropriate 
for Mr. Ernstsen to pay $1,451.00 per month as alimony. [TR 
453] 
15. At paragraph 16. F. on page 18 of Response Brief of 
Appellee, the Appellee states: 
16.F. ...No bias or prejudice was manifested at the 
pre-trial conference. [R 354] 
This statement should read, "If the issue of bias or prejudice 
is a legitimate one, it was manifest at the pre-trial conference." [R 
354] 
ARGUMENT I. 
THE APPELLATE COURT MAY NOT REJECT THIS APPEAL 
OUTRIGHT BECAUSE APPELLANT HAS MET THE STANDARD OF 
REVIEW BY MARSHALING ALL OF THE EVIDENCE AND 
DEMONSTRATING CLEAR ERROR. 
The Appellee argues that "the Court may reject this Appeal 
outright because Appellant has failed utterly to meet the standard of 
review requiring Appellant to marshal all of the evidence and show clear 
error." [Response Brief of Appellee] The Appellee cites Oneida/Slic v. 
Oneida Cold Storage & Warehouse, Inc., 872 P.2d (Utah App. 1994) which 
states: 
11 
To successfully challenge a trial court's findings 
of fact, Appellate counsel must play the devil's 
advocate. [Attorneys] must extricate [themselves] 
from the client's shoes and fully assume the 
adversary's position. In order to properly 
discharge the [marshaling] duty..., the challenger 
must present in comprehensive and fastidious order 
every scrap of competent evidence introduced at 
trial which supports the very finding Appellant 
resists. West Valley v. Majestic Inv. Co., 818 
P.2d 1311, 1315 (Utah App. 1991); accord In Re 
Estate of Bartell, 776 P.2d 885, 886 (Utah 1989); 
State v. Walker, 743 P.2d 191, 193 (Utah 1987); 
Commercial Union Associations v. Clayton, 863 P.2d 
29, 36 (Utah App. 1993); Ohline Corp. v. Granite 
Mill, 849 P.2d 602, 604 (Utah App. 1993). 
Oneida further states: 
Once Appellants have established the pillar 
supporting their adversary's position, then they 
"must ferret out a fatal flaw in the evidence" and 
show why those pillars fail to support the trial 
court's findings. West Valley City v. Majestic 
Inv. Co,, 818 P.2d 314. [Page 1053] 
Appellants who merely present carefully selected 
facts and excerpts from trial testimony in support 
of their position do not properly marshal the 
evidence as required to challenge the trial court's 
factual findings. [Page 1051] 
Marshaling the evidence first entails marshaling, or listing, 
all of the evidence supporting the findings that are challenged. Alta 
Indus, Ltd. v. Hurst, 846 P.2d 1282, 1286 (Utah 1993); Saunders v. 
Sharp, 806 P.2d 198, 199 (Utah 1991); State v. Moosman, 794 P.2d 474, 
475-76 (Utah 1990); Grayson Roper, Ltd. v. Finlinson, 782 P.2d 467, 470 
(Utah 1989); Reid v. Mutual of Omaha Insurance Co., 776 P.2d 896, 899-
900 (Utah 1989); In Re: Estate of Bartell, 776 P.2d 885, 886 (Utah 
1989); Scharf v. BMG Corp., 700 P.2d 1068, 1070 (Utah 1985); In Re: 
Estate of Hamilton, 869 P.2d 971, 977 (Utah App. 1994); Willev v. 
Willev, 866 P.2d 547, 551 n.2 (Utah App. 1993); Baker v. Baker, 866 P.2d 
540, 543 (Utah App. 1993); Robb v. Anderson, 863 P.2d 1322, 1327; 
Commercial Union Assoc, v. Clayton, 863 P.2d 29, 36 (Utah App. 1993); 
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State v. Haves, 860 P.2d 968, 972 (Utah App. 1993); State v. Gray, 851 
P.2d 1217, 1225 (Utah App. Cert, denied, 860 P.2d 943 (Utah 1993)); King 
v. Industrial Commission, 850 P.2d 1281, 1285 (Utah App. 1993); Johnson 
v. Board of Review, 842 P.2d 910, 912 (Utah App. 1992); State v. 
Peterson, 841 P.2d 21, 25 (Utah App. 1992); State v. Hurst, 821 P.2d 
467, 471 (Utah App. 1991). 
In the present case, the Appellant has "listed" or "marshaled" all 
of the evidence supporting the findings that are challenged. Appellant 
has "marshaled" all the evidence in the section entitled "Statement of 
Facts" beginning on page 7 and concluding on page 30. The Statement of 
Facts includes testimony given by Ila Ernstsen, Terral Ernstsen, Randall 
Petersen (Defendant's expert) and Guy Morris (Plaintiff's expert). In 
addition, Appellant has provided the Appellate Court a copy of all 
exhibits introduced at the trial in the Appendix of Appellant. 
Once the evidence is listed or marshaled with the appropriate 
citations to the record, the Appellant must then demonstrate that the 
marshaled evidence is legally insufficient to support the findings when 
viewing the evidence and inferences in a light most favorable to the 
decision. Stewart v. Board of Review, 831 P.2d 134, 138 (Utah App. 
1992). The Appellant has met the burden of demonstrating that the 
marshaled evidence is legally insufficient to support the findings when 
viewing the evidence and inferences in a light most favorable to the 
decision. [See Brief of Appellant, "Argument", pages 32-43] After 
marshalling all the evidence, the Appellant has clearly demonstrated 
that the Court committed error by failing to consider the historical 
income of the Plaintiff by failing to consider net corporate income and 
mixing the division of assets with the post-marital duty of support and 
maintenance. Accordingly, the Appellant's duty to marshal the evidence 
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has been properly discharged and the Appellate Court must consider the 
merits of the challenges to the findings. 
ARGUMENT II. 
THE COURT COMMITTED AN ERROR IN LAW BY AWARDING THE DEFENDANT 
$lf450 PER MONTH AS ALIMONY. 
A. The Appellants Appeal should not be dismissed because the 
District Court denied Defendant's Motion for New Trial. 
The Appellee argues that Appellant's Appeal should be 
dismissed because the District Court denied Defendant's Motion for New 
Trial. Rule 59, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, states that: 
(a) Grounds. Subject to the provisions of Rule 61, a new 
trial may be granted to all of any of the parties on all 
or any part of the issues for any of the following 
causes; provided, however, that on a motion for a new 
trial and an action tried without a jury, the court may 
open the judgment if one has been entered, take 
additional testimony, amend findings of fact and 
conclusions of law or make new findings and conclusions, 
and direct the entry of a new judgment: (7) error in law. 
A Rule 59 Motion for New Trial is a post-trial remedy that is 
outlined in the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. The fact that the 
District Court rejected the Defendant's Motion for New Trial may not be 
construed as "bolstering" Appellee's position that the Appeal should be 
dismissed. Rule 59, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, contemplates the 
fact that a party may file an Appeal. Pursuant to Hume v. Small Claims 
Court, 590 P.2d 309 (Utah 1979); Interstate Land Corp. v. Patterson, 797 
P.2d 1101 (Utah App. 1990), a timely Motion under Rule 59 terminates the 
running of the time for Appeal of a Judgment and the time for Appeal 
does not begin to run again until the Order granting or denying such 
Motion is entered. Consequently, the fact that the District Court 
denied Defendant's Motion for New Trial is not a basis on which 
Defendant's Appeal should be dismissed. 
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B. The District Court failed to consider Defendant's needs. 
The Appellee argues that the District Court fairly considered 
wife's needs. The Appellee states: 
The Court merely observed, with only nine payments remaining 
on the cabin, she could reduce the $700 plus payment to a 
nominal amount. The Court also properly observed the vehicle 
could be financed to reduce its monthly payment. [Response 
Brief of Appellee, page 26] 
However, the Court made the following specific findings: 
25. The Court recognizes that the Defendant has a $721 per 
month debt owing to Zions Bank for a garage; a $455 auto 
payment, and a $300 per month tax liability on alimony. 
26. The Court finds that based on the alimony award it is 
reasonable that the Defendant refinance the two major 
expenses of her current monthly expenses, the $721 
mortgage payment and the $455 auto payment over a 15-year 
period. 
27. The Court finds that based on the alimony award, the 
Defendant has an obligation to engage in creative 
financial planning. [See Appendix of Appellant] 
The Judge found that a woman of 61, having no abilities, being 
unemployed, and no income history, would be able to refinance her 
liabilities over 15 years. Even after stating that he recognized the 
wife's needs, the Judge completely ignored her needs. The Judge made 
specific findings for the restructuring of the Defendant's liabilities, 
which are not possible given the Defendant's health and age, income and 
ability, and the fact that no financial institution will finance an 
automobile for 15 years. 
C. The District Court failed to consider Defendant's ability to 
produce sufficient income for herself. 
The Appellee argues that the District Court fairly considered 
wife's ability to produce income for herself. The Appellee argues that 
the Court considered: 
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Evidence supporting the finding that the parties never lived 
in the Fruitlandf Utah, cabin together, that she lived for the 
past year in her sister's condominium, that she cannot travel 
to Fruitland in winter months, and that she plans to sell the 
cabin for her retirement." [Response Brief of Appellee, page 
27] 
However, the Defendant testified that she was not currently 
employed and that she has not worked for a wage in about 40 years. [TR 
531] The Defendant also testified that she is currently a severe 
diabetic and is required to take insulin on a daily basis and it would 
be very difficult for her to hold down a job because of her diabetic 
condition and the fact that she is 61 years of age. [TR 532] 
The Appellee argues that the District Court correctly treated 
her "recreational property" as income producing that would offset 
husband's truck leases. However, the Defendant testified that the home 
at Fruitland was the marital residence because the Plaintiff sold the 
family home in Salt Lake City and purchased the Fruitland residence and 
that she is going to live in the Fruitland home on a permanent basis. 
[TR 533 and 534] That testimony was unrefuted by any evidence and 
testimony presented by the Plaintiff. It is clear that the Court erred 
in its application of the law in this case. It is unreasonable and 
inappropriate to require the Defendant to use her automobile, her 
furniture and her home to generate income to set off against the 
Plaintiff's ability to pay alimony. 
D« The District Court failed to consider all of Plaintiff's 
income. 
The Plaintiff has attached two exhibits (AEE's Addenda 10 and 
11) that were not admitted into evidence at the trial. These two 
exhibits were created solely for use in the Response Brief of Appellee. 
These exhibits were not part of the Court record and should be stricken. 
16 
Nonetheless, after reviewing these two exhibits, they contain 
inaccurate and misleading information which is not supported by the 
record. For example, in column 1 entitled "Husband's Monthly Net 
Available Funds at His Historical Salary Minus Truck Leases," the 
Plaintiff states that his pre-September 1992 net income was $501.51 per 
week. The Plaintiff gives the citation of TR 32. However, in reviewing 
TR 32, there is no testimony given stating that Plaintiff's pre-
September 1992 net income is $501.51 per week. In column 2 entitled 
"Husband's Monthly Net Available Funds at His Historical Salary Plus 
Truck Leases," the Plaintiff states that his net salary is $2,173.25. 
That figure is not supported by the record nor by Plaintiff's Exhibit 
No. 4. Further, closer examination of document "AEE" discloses that it 
is replete with inaccuracies. For instance, Appellee mixes "gross" and 
"net" incomes; he fails to reduce the debt accurately; and he includes 
a debt that is paid off in four months. However, the record does state 
that Plaintiff's gross income per month is $5,530.60, which supports 
Defendant's request for $2,750 per month in alimony. 
The Plaintiff argues that the District Court equitably 
distributed husband's available income. The Plaintiff argues that 
Defendant's own "expert conceded that he had reviewed no documents and 
offered no testimony to rebut Morris' testimony that corporate funds 
were not available to husband." [Response Brief of Appellee, page 28, 
Plaintiff fails to provide a citation to the record] However, this 
statement is incorrect. In fact, the record reflects that Randall 
Petersen testified that he reviewed the parties' tax returns for the 
years 1988, 1989, 1990, and 1991 [TR 411], and that corporate funds 
should be added back to Plaintiff's income. Randall Petersen testified 
as follows: 
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Craig Peterson: 
Randall Petersen: 
Craig Peterson: 
Randall Petersen: 
Craig Peterson: 
Randall Petersen: 
Craig Peterson: 
Randall Petersen: 
Judge Young: 
Craig Peterson: 
Randall Petersen: 
Craig Peterson: 
Randall Petersen: 
Craig Peterson: 
Then the term, the next term, "spendable 
income add back corporate net income, why have 
you done that? Where did you get those 
numbers? 
The corporate income represents the net income 
after tax which was part of the valuation 
report. I believe Schedule 3 shows the net 
after tax corporate income for the years 1988 
through 1991. And the reason I show that in 
there is simply because if he chooses to make 
his salary whatever he makes it and leave 
income in the corporation, it seems to me that 
is still income available to him. 
Let me ask you in that regard, were you the 
expert in the case entitled Muir v. Muir? 
Yes. 
And in fact, did you testify before this 
district court in that case? 
Yes. 
And did you testify using exactly this same 
methodology in that case? 
I think this is a basic concept. 
I do not have any problem with this 
methodology. 
Did you testify in Muir v. Muir that corporate 
profits — first of all, was Mr. Muir, as you 
understand the testimony and the evidence 
presented in that trial, a sole stock holder 
in that case as is Mr. Ernstsen here? 
I believe he was, yes. 
In that case did you testify that Mr. Muir had 
the corporation profits remaining at each 
year-end which should be added to his income? 
I believe that is the case, yes. 
And did you take that same approach in that 
case? 
Randall Petersen: Yes. 
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Craig Peterson: 
Randall Petersen: 
Craig Peterson: 
Randall Petersen: 
Craig Peterson: 
Randall Petersen: 
Craig Peterson: 
Randall Petersen: 
Craig Peterson: 
Randall Petersen: 
Craig Peterson: 
Randall Petersen: 
All right. Is it your position then that the 
corporate profits on average should be added 
back to Mr. Ernstsen's spendable income or 
cash available to him to spend? 
I believe it should, yes. 
Then in making this analysis
 f you did not at 
any time include benefits, other benefits he 
may receive from the corporation such as 
automobile expense or paying professional fees 
or any other thing which might come out of the 
business; is that correct? 
This corporate 
deductions. 
income is after those 
So in addition to what you show here as 
spendable income, $74,000 on average, $74,839, 
you have not included the benefits which Mr. 
Ernstsen gets from the company. 
No. 
For instance, his automobile payment. 
No. 
Or his auto expense. 
His income is actually the lease payment which 
was made to him. 
I understand that. 
But yeah, it does not add back in personal 
benefits derived by the corporation, no. [TR 
412-414] 
Randall Petersen testified under cross-examination with 
respect to Exhibit D-7, "Add Corporate Income," that he did not have the 
financial statements but had the report of the appraiser Vaughn Cox 
which included Balance Sheets and Summary Income Statements. Randall 
Peterson testified on cross-examination: 
Clark Ward: So it would be foolhardy for someone to take 
any of this money, just spend it on himself 
for whatever reason. He would be putting his 
company and all his employees and his own 
salary at risk in doing so wouldn't he? 
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Randall Petersen: Well, I suppose you can make that argument, 
but if he leaves his salary low and leaves the 
earnings in there, then you wouldn't. Then 
you have got his income low. I don't know how 
you can ignore the fact that he leaves income 
in the corporation. That's his decision. And 
he could have cut his salary to $20,000 and 
left $50,000 profit in there too. 
Plaintiff's counsel cites Muir v. Muir, 841 P.2d 736, 741 (Utah 
App. 1992), and states that the Muir decision supports husband's 
position "because it holds corporate net profits should not be added to 
husband's income unless it can be shown that the money stayed in the 
corporation for discretionary improvements that would benefit husband 
rather than to "maintain [the businesses] in a condition." [Response 
Brief of Appellee] In the Muir case, however, the Court made the 
finding that the husband needed to reinvest in the business. The 
Appellate Court stated "the finding that husband would need to reinvest 
in the business is problematic because the Court failed to find whether 
the reinvestment constituted a "discretionary decision...to expand and 
improve" or whether the reinvestment was to "maintain it in its present 
condition." [Muir quoting Jones v. Jones, 100 P.2d 1076 (Utah 1985)] 
In the present case, the Court did not consider the corporate net income 
in the amount of $14,385 and made no findings regarding that corporate 
net income. The Muir case states that the Court is required to consider 
corporate income as well as review the benefits received from the 
corporation. In the present case, the Court not only failed to consider 
corporate net income, but also failed to take into consideration the 
personal benefits Plaintiff is receiving from the corporation. For 
example, the Defendant testified that he does not have any living 
expenses as he is living with his girl friend, Michelle Howard, who is 
employed by Ernstsen Plumbing. [TR 494] The Plaintiff further 
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testified that he and Michelle Howard intend to get married following 
the divorce from Ila Ernstsen. [TR 510] Plaintiff testified that his 
personal automobile, auto insurance, tax and license, and his health, 
accident and life insurance are paid by Ernstsen Plumbing. [TR 505, 507 
and 509] 
The Plaintiff states that "wife offered no evidence to rebut 
husband's testimony that his business is failing and the corporate 
profits were left in the corporation to save the business." [Response 
Brief of Appellee, page 28] The Plaintiff did testify that he depleted 
all of the money in his bank account, "gone without" and borrowed $1,500 
from Ernstsen Plumbing to pay wife's temporary alimony. However, there 
is no testimony given by the Plaintiff that indicates his business was 
failing and the corporate profits were left in to save the business. 
Furthermore, the Plaintiff's expert, Guy Morris, testified that if the 
corporate earnings were cash, it would be available for distribution. 
[TR 526-527] 
ARGUMENT III. 
JUDGE YOUNG PREDICATED HIS PERSONAL HYPOTHETICAL POSITION OF 
AN ADVOCATE IN SUPPORT OF HIS THEORY RATHER THAN ALLOWING THE 
CASE TO BE TRIED TO HIM. CONSEQUENTLY. JUDGE YOUNG SHOULD BE 
REMOVED FROM FURTHER PROCEEDINGS IN THIS CASE AND A NEW JUDGE 
SHOULD BE ASSIGNED. 
The Plaintiff argues that "the recusal issue is moot since wife's 
appeal lacks any legal or factual basis for reversal and remand." 
[Response Brief of Appellee, page 30] The Defendant has marshaled all 
of the evidence in this case and has demonstrated that the findings made 
by the District Court are erroneous and should be reversed and remanded. 
The Plaintiff argues that "The trial was to the bench; hence, there 
was no jury to prejudice and Judge Young expressed none." [Response 
Brief of Appellee, page 30] Obviously, a jury was not involved in this 
matter as it was a domestic proceeding. Plaintiff's argument that Judge 
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Young did not express any prejudice is false. Judge Young's prejudice 
and bias against Defendant's position is clearly evidenced by the fact 
that 60% of the examination of Randall Petersen was conducted by Judge 
Young and the fact that Judge Young became so attached to his personal 
position that he ascribed earning capability not only to the home but to 
the Defendant's furniture and furnishings as well as to her automobile. 
Appellee argues that "Wife waived all claims related to recusal by 
not raising them immediately after the facts which formed the basis for 
disqualification became known." [Response Brief of Appellee, page 30] 
In support of this assertion, Plaintiff cites Madsen v. Prudential, 767 
P.2d 538 (Utah 1988), and states that the Madsen case is nearly 
identical to the present case. However, the Madsen case can be clearly 
distinguished from the present case. In the Madsen case, the Appellate 
Court states "that a party who has reasonable basis for moving to 
disqualify a Judge may not delay in hope of first obtaining a favorable 
ruling and then complain only if the result is unfavorable." [At page 
542] In the Madsen case, the Plaintiffs were representatives of a 
certified class of borrowers whose trust deeds with Prudential Federal 
Savings & Loan Association (hereinafter "Prudential") contained language 
identical to that contained in Madsen's trust deed. In 1984, the action 
was assigned to Judge Kenneth Rigtrup. At the close of the trial, Judge 
Rigtrup ruled from the bench. However, prior to Judge Rigtrup's ruling 
an exchange occurred between the Court, the attorney for Prudential and 
the attorney for the Madsens whereby it was brought to everyone's 
attention that Judge Rigtrup had been a customer of Prudential Federal 
Savings & Loan Association. The attorneys for Prudential did not object 
during the course of the exchange, and after the ruling, Judge Rigtrup 
asked if either wished to take any exceptions, and Prudential's attorney 
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stated only that an appeal was anticipated before any class issues would 
be addressed. However, no specific objection to Judge Rigtrup's 
qualifications was voiced. Thirty-nine days after Judge Rigtrup 
announced his decision, Prudential raised its first formal Objection to 
Judge Rigtrup's qualifications to hear the case by filing a Motion for 
Disqualification under Rule 63(b), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. In 
that case, the Appellate Court ruled that the Motion was not timely. In 
the present case, the extent of Judge Young's bias was not fully 
revealed until after the trial had concluded. The trial concluded on 
January 8, 1994, and the Motion for Recusal was filed on February 12, 
1994. In the Madsen case, it is clear that the Defendant did raise the 
issue of disqualification in hopes of obtaining a favorable ruling. In 
the present case, however, Judge Young's bias and prejudice was not 
revealed until the trial had been concluded at which time Defendant's 
counsel filed a Motion to Disqualify as soon as practicable after the 
bias and prejudice was known. 
Rule 63(b), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, states: 
Whenever a party to an action or proceeding, civil or 
criminal, or his attorney shall make and file an affidavit 
that the judge before whom such action or proceeding is to be 
tried or heard has a bias or prejudice, either against such 
party or his attorney or in favor of any opposite party to the 
suit, such judge shall proceed no further than except to call 
in another judge to hear and determine the matter. 
Every such affidavit shall state facts and the reasons for the 
belief that such bias or prejudice exists and shall be filed 
as soon as practicable after the case has been assigned or 
such bias or prejudice is known... 
Consequently, Defendant complied with the requirements of Rule 
63(b), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. In any event, it would be 
appropriate for the Appellate Court to consider the Defendant's claim of 
bias pursuant to Marchant v. Marchant, 743 P.2d 199 (Utah App. 1987). 
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The Appellate Court addressed the issue of bias sua sponte as the issue 
was not brought up in the lower Court. 
ARGUMENT IV, 
ATTORNEY'S FEES 
Plaintiff argues that Defendant's "Request for Attorney's Fees must 
be rejected out of hand." [Response Brief of Appellee, page 32] 
However, Defendant was awarded $4,000 in attorney's fees by the District 
Court. In a domestic case, where the trial Court has awarded attorney's 
fees and the receiving spouse has prevailed on the main issues, the 
Court generally awards fees on Appeal. Hall v. Hall, 858 P.2d 1018,1037 
(Utah App. 1993); Allred v. Allred, 835 P.2d 974, 979 (Utah App. 1992). 
Accordingly, the Appellate Court should award the Appellant attorney's 
fees on appeal and remand for determination of the amount of reasonable 
fees. 
CONCLUSION 
Appellee's Response Brief was so riddled with errors and 
misstatements that approximately one-half of the Reply Brief was devoted 
to correcting these errors. 
Appellee's Brief fails to refute any of the arguments presented to 
the Court for review. It is evident that the Court committed error by 
failing to recognize Defendant's historical income and ignoring all of 
Defendant's present income, attributing income potential to dormant 
assets awarded to the Defendant, attributing income to the Defendant 
which did not exist as a matter of evidence, and by demonstrating 
prejudice and bias by becoming an advocate. 
The Court should remand this case with instructions to the lower 
Court to enter a award of alimony of $2,750 per month retroactive to the 
date of the entry of the original Decree. Further, Judge Young should 
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be directed to recuse himself from further proceedings in this case and 
a new Judge should be assigned. Finally, the Court should award the 
Appellant attorney's fees on Appeal and remand for determination on the 
amount of reasonable fees. 
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